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There is substantial cross - country variation in secondary school design, with some countries 
tracking students into different ability schools very early, and other countries with little or no 
tracking at all. Does tracking length affects school performance, as measured by standardized 
test scores? We use the international data from the International Adult Literacy Survey to 
estimate the relationship between the experienced tracking length and the performance in 
standardized cognitive test scores of young adults, aged between 16 and the mid - twenties. 
Our IV estimates suggest that the contribution of tracking to performance is positive and 
statistically significant: conditional on total years of schooling, one additional year spent in a 
track raises average performance by 3.3 to 3.4 percentage points, depending on the estimates. 
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Introduction 
 
In many education systems around the world, heterogeneous pupils are initially mixed 
in comprehensive schools - typically primary and lower secondary education. At some stage 
of the curriculum, some form of (self) selection takes place, typically based on ability and 
past performance, and students are allocated to schools which specialize in different curricula 
(tracks) or to classes where subjects are taught at a different level of difficulty (streams). The 
former system is typical of Central European countries, such as Germany, Austria, The 
Netherlands and Hungary, but also of Korea, China, Brazil, The Russian Federation, Egypt 
and Japan, and the latter system is typically observed in the US.  
We define the allocation of students into different schools or classes as “tracking”. 
Selection and diversification of curricula are typical features of college education (see Shavitt 
et al, 2007), but in this paper we are concerned exclusively with the tracking of secondary 
schools. Critics of early tracking systems argue that high-performing students gain from 
tracking at the expense of their lower-performance peers. While well placed, this concern with 
equality of opportunity prompts the following question: is there a trade-off between equality 
of opportunity and efficiency, and if yes, what are the efficiency costs of de-tracking 
secondary schools? A natural way of measuring the relative efficiency of tracking is to 
investigate  whether selective schooling affects individual accumulation of human capital, as 
measured by the results of standardized cognitive tests. Such investigation is informative for 
the question at hand if productivity at school and in the labour market are correlated, and the 
costs of tracked and untracked systems are roughly comparable. Even granting this, the 
empirical task is fraught with difficulties, as documented for the US by Betts and Shkolnik, 
2000, and Figlio and Page, 2000, among others.  
In a recent study, Hanushek and Wossmann, 2006, (HW from now on), adopt a 
difference in difference strategy in a multi-country setup, and compare the standardized test 
scores of primary school students, who are typically not tracked in all countries, with those of 
older students, aged 14 to 15, who in some countries – most notably Germany, Austria and 
Hungary - are already in a tracked school. Their strategy has two merits: it ensures that the 
allocation to treatment (tracking) is exogenous, and it generates the within - country variation 
required to evaluate the impact of a country – specific institution such as tracking. HW find 
evidence that early tracking increases inequality, but no evidence that it positively affect 
average school performance. If anything, performance declines in countries with earlier 
tracking.    4
Since the treatment group in the HW sample is very young, one potential problem with 
this interesting study is that, unless tracking has almost immediate effects, it cannot properly 
evaluate the contribution of tracking to performance in the countries where tracking starts at 
15 or later
1. According to the OECD, the age of first selection into tracking or streaming is 
either 15 or 16 in the majority of OECD countries, including the US, the UK, France, Japan 
and Scandinavia, to which one should add large non OECD countries, such as China, the 
Russian Federation, Brazil and Egypt. Since the early tracking analyzed by HW is likely to be 
mainly that of central continental Europe (Germany and some of its neighbours), a natural 
question is whether their results hold in a larger sample of countries.   
In this paper, we investigate the efficiency of secondary school tracking using a 
different empirical strategy. We share with HW the use of a multi-country setup, but focus 
instead on a sample of older individuals – aged between 16 and the mid twenties, depending 
on the country – who have experienced in their own country different tracking lengths. 
Therefore, instead of comparing individuals who have been exposed to tracking to individuals 
without such exposure, we compare individuals with different degrees of exposure to the 
same policy, including no exposure at all. For this purpose, we use the International Adult 
Literacy Survey (IALS), an international survey of adults aged 16 or older sponsored by the 
OECD and covering 19 countries
2. 
By focusing on older individuals, our approach has the advantage that the 
investigation is not restricted to early tracking countries. Moreover, by comparing individuals 
of different age within the same country, we can ask whether school performance is affected 
by tracking length, rather than by the mere existence of a tracking system. One disadvantage 
of our approach is that assignment to treatment cannot be considered as exogenous, because 
the variation of tracking length in our sample is partly due to age and country effects, and 
partly the result of individual behaviour, which affects the likelihood of dropping out of 
school.  
  We use instrumental variables to deal with endogenous selection into tracking, and 
find that one additional year of school spent in a track contributes significantly more to school 
outcomes than the same year spent in a comprehensive system. We hasten to stress that our 
estimates uncover the effect of tracking on school performance for the sub-sample of 
                                                 
1 Because the average student age in the PISA dataset is 15 years and 9 months, the authors claim that they can 
also capture the effects of tracking in systems that track at 15. This is difficult to believe if the effect of tracking 
on school performance operates via peer effects of differential learning. 
2 These countries are: Switzerland, Germany, the US, the UK, Ireland, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, New 
Zealand, Belgium, Italy, Norway, Slovenia, The Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Canada and 
Chile.   5
individuals whose treatment status is changed by the selected instrument (compliers), and do 
not automatically apply to a randomly chosen individual. It is well known that local average 
treatment effects can differ substantially from average treatment effects if the fraction of the 
population affected by the instruments is small (Oreopoulos, 2006). Still, we believe that our 
results cast some doubt on the view that de-tracking secondary schools have positive equity 
implications without any efficiency cost.  
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we describe in detail our 
empirical strategy. Section 2 introduces the data and Section 3 presents the results. A final 
brief section concludes. 
 
1. The Empirical Strategy 
 
Consider the following empirical model 
 
ic ic ic c ic E X A ε γ β α + + + =          [ 1 ]  
 
where the subscripts i and c are for the individual and the country, A is the log of individual 
achievement in a standardized cognitive test, α  is a country specific intercept, X is a vector 
of individual controls, and E is years of completed education from primary to upper 
secondary school, net of repeated grades
3. This specification implies that the contribution of 
each year of education to the log score is constant and equal to γ .  
Let T  be the number of years spent in a tracking system, be it academic / vocational as 
in the European or Asian context, or honours/general as in the US (see Rees, Argys and 
Brewer, 1996)
4. Conditional on the number of years of education, time spent in tracking 
improves log performance if 
 
  ic ic ic ic c ic T E X A ε γ σ γ β α + − + + + = ) (        [ 2 ]  
 
where  0 ) ( > −γ σ . In this specification, one year of education in a comprehensive system and 
in a tracking system addγ and γ σ > to log performance respectively.  Equation [2] can also be 
written more explicitly as  
                                                 
3 By excluding repeated grades, we assume that repetition does not contribute by itself to performance in a test.  
4 We are grateful to Dominic Brewer for advice on the US institutional setup.   6
 
ic ic ic ic c ic T NT X A ε σ γ β α + + + + =         [ 3 ]  
 
where NT  is the number of years spent in a comprehensive system, and E=NT+T.   
  As discussed in the related literature, a number of problems need to be overcome to 
estimate equations [2] or [3]. First, school design, including tracking, is typically country - 
specific. If all students in a country are subject to the same system, the impact of tracking 
cannot be disentangled from the host of other country - specific effects on school 
performance. More precisely, let  c ic T T = . If we control country - specific effects with country 
dummies, the effect of tracking is not identified, because of the lack of a control group. HW 
cleverly address this problem by noticing that no country tracks individuals in primary 
schools. Therefore, pupils in these schools can be used as the control group. They combine 
survey data which include test scores from primary and secondary schools and adopt a 
difference in difference approach.  
To identify the impact of tracking, we focus on an alternative source of within - 
country variation, generated by the fact that, even within the same country, pupils are exposed 
to different tracking lengths, either because of age – with older pupils having more tracking 
than younger pupils – or because, conditional on country and age, some students drop out 
before completing upper secondary education. To illustrate, let  s Z  and  e Z  be the years of 
education when tracking starts and upper secondary education is expected to be completed, 
respectively. To exemplify, in Germany  s Z  and  e Z  are equal to 4 and 13. Then individual 
tracking length in secondary schools is given by  
 
0 = T       if  s Z Z ≤     
s Z E T − =       if  e s Z E Z < <           [4] 
 
According to definition [4], within - country variation in tracking length is guaranteed by a) 
age variation, as younger individuals have not yet completed upper secondary education and 
the entire tracking span; b) educational variation for a given age, as some individuals drop out 
of school before completing a degree; c) curriculum differences, because in some countries 
individuals enrolled in a vocational track can typically complete education one year earlier   7
than pupils in the general track – see for instance Germany and Switzerland – and thereby be 
exposed to shorter tracking.  
  A second problem with the estimation of [3] is the presence of unobserved individual 
characteristics, such as ability or motivation. If these unobservables are correlated with the 
education variables NT  and  T, because less academically talented or less motivated 
individuals are more likely to drop out of school before completion of upper secondary 
education, ordinary least squares estimates of [3] are biased (see the discussion in Betts and 
Shkolnik, 2000). As discussed by Heckman and Li, 2002, there are three main strategies to 
attenuate ability bias: a) instrumental variables; b) fixed effect estimators; c) selection on 
observables, which consists of including in the regression a vector of variables that proxy 
unobserved ability, motivation or effort. The second approach requires panel data. In the 
absence of such data, our empirical strategy combines points a) and c).  
  We include in [3] a large number of observables, which capture a) family background:  
parental education, occupation, and country of birth; b) motivation:  dummy variables for 
early withdrawal from school due to boredom, dislike of school, and desire to learn a trade; c) 
health: dummy variables for visual, hearing, learning and speech disabilities, both current and 
at the time of primary and secondary school; d) current cultural and social activities, such as 
the use of public libraries, attending a cultural or sporting event, volunteering, reading books 
and newspapers and listening to music; e) self  assessed literacy: dummy variables for 
individual rating of writing and reading skills, and indicators of dependency on others for 
basic literacy tasks; f) work activities:  labour market status and type of work. 
As shown in Table 1, the end of compulsory education typically occurs either at the 
age when tracking starts or later. Therefore, the years NT spent in a comprehensive school are 
also years of compulsory education. While the implementation of compulsory schooling laws 
is not always perfect, OECD enrolment data for 2004 show that more than 90 percent of the 
relevant age cohort is still in school before the end of compulsory education in most of the 
countries included in the table. This percentage falls substantially after the end of compulsory 
education, at least outside of Scandinavia, with the decline ranging from 11 percentage points 
in Germany to 33 percentage points in the UK and 35 percentage points in the US (OECD, 
2006, Table C1.3)
5. These facts motivate our assumption that, conditional on the set of 
observables described above, the number of years NT spent in comprehensive schooling are 
exogenous, and driven mainly by compulsory schooling laws. Given this assumption, which 
                                                 
5 We are implicitly assuming that the 2004 figures are relevant also for schooling done 10 years earlier.   8
we test in the data using the standard Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, equation [3] 
contains a single endogenous variable, tracking length T. We address this problem by using 
instrumental variables.  
 
2. The Data 
 
The IALS survey was implemented in three different waves – 1994, 1996, 1998 – 
using a common questionnaire, with the purpose of collecting comparable information on 
adult literacy. Literacy in the survey has three dimensions: prose, document and quantitative. 
Prose literacy is defined as the knowledge and skills needed to understand and use 
information from texts including editorials, news stories, poems and fictions. Document 
literacy pertains to  the knowledge and skills required to locate and use information contained 
in various formats, including job applications, payroll notices, transportation schedules, maps, 
tables and graphics. Quantitative literacy is defined as the knowledge required to apply 
arithmetic operations, either alone or sequentially, to numbers embedded in printed materials, 
calculating a tip, completing an order form, or determining the amount of interest on a loan
6. 
Results of the tests are scaled in the range (0,500). We use the log of the simple average of the 
three available measures of literacy as the dependent variable in [3]. 
We select the sub-sample of young individuals aged between 16 and age t-1970, where 
t is the year of the country – specific survey, which ranges from 1994 to 1998
7. There are 
three reasons for this choice: first, we wish to reduce the recall error in the number of years of 
completed education, which is likely to be lower the closer the individual is to the time spent 
in formal education. Second, we expect the contribution of schooling to the literacy test scores 
of young individuals to be predominant when compared to older adults, who are more likely 
to be affected in their scores by sub-sequent labour market experience. Last but not least, 
since the IALS survey has been taken between 1994 and 1998, depending on the country, our 
selected sample has experienced secondary school between the early 1980s and the second 
part of the 1990s. By choosing this age window, we reduce the risk of including individuals 
who have been exposed to different secondary school systems within the same country, due to 
educational reforms. This risk leads us to exclude two countries from our data: the Czech 
                                                 
6 See the IALS User’s Guide for further details.  
7 Since we want to focus on secondary education, we exclude from the sample those individuals who have 
completed a number of years of education – net of repetition - higher than  e Z or have attained a level of 
education higher than ISCED 3, which corresponds to upper secondary education.   9
Republic, which anticipated tracking from 15 to 11 in the early 1990s by allowing pupils to 
complete their compulsory education either in normal school or in the more selective 
gymnasium, and The Netherlands, which introduced in 1993 an additional year of compulsory 
education, thereby delaying tracking to age 13 (see Brunello and Checchi, 2007)
8.  
The construction of individual tracking length requires information on the year when 
primary education starts, upper secondary education finishes, and tracking starts. This 
information is reported in Table 1. We use several sources to collect the relevant data, 
including OECD Education at a Glance, various issues, the UNESCO website 
(http://www.unesco.org), the Eurydice website  (http://www.eurydice.org), national sources and Table 
1 in Brunello and Checchi, 2007, which reports the age of first selection into tracks in the mid 
1980s and mid 1990s
9. Finally, the information on the years of completed education is taken 
from the following question in the IALS questionnaire: “During your lifetime, how many 
years of formal education have you completed, beginning with first level, first grade, first 




Standard human capital theory suggests that rational individuals should drop out of 
school when the expected benefits from continuing education are inferior to the expected 
costs. Some of these benefits and costs depend on individual ability, motivation and effort, 
which are also correlated with school performance. Other costs depend instead on external 
constraints – such as lack of financial resources, illness or family reasons – and are not 
correlated in any obvious way to ability or motivation. Therefore, empirical measures of these 
costs are good candidates as instrumental variables for the years of tracking. 
The IALS survey includes a question asking the main reason why individuals stopped 
their schooling when they did. This question is addressed to individuals who have not yet 
completed upper secondary or higher education, and picks up the reasons for dropping out of 
school beforehand. We use the replies to construct three dummy variables: a) a dummy taking 
the value 1 if the individual stopped school because of financial constraints, and zero 
otherwise; b) a dummy taking the value 1 if the individual stopped school because of family 
                                                 
8 We also exclude Canada because of the limited information on parental background. 
9 While streaming in the US can start early depending on the school, we select the 10
th grade as the age of first 
selection, in line with the OECD and based on the statistical information provided by Rees, Argys and Brewer 
(1996).  
   10
reasons, such as marriage, pregnancy and illness at home, and zero otherwise; c) a dummy 
taking the value 1 if the individual stopped school because of personal constraints (illness) or 
institutional constraints (school not available/not accessible). We use these three dummies as 
instruments of tracking length, and test for instrument validity using the Hansen J test.   
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of the key variables used in the 
regressions. The average test score in our sample of 6984 individuals is 267.08 (standard 
deviation: 53.05), and the average number of years of education is 10.70, of which 8.13 are 
spent in a comprehensive schooling system. Close to 9 percent of the individuals in our 
sample has been affected by financial, family, health and school problems, leading to 
premature interruption of school. Importantly, dropouts because of exogenous reasons differ 
from the remaining sample of dropouts only marginally in the number of years spent in a 
comprehensive school (8.11 versus 8.22) and more significantly in the number of years spent 
in a tracked school (1.06 versus 1.60).  
  We estimate two alternative specifications of equation [3]: in the first and more 
parsimonious specification, we capture country specific effects with country dummies and age 
effects with a second order polynomial in age. In the second, we use country by age dummies. 
Since the number of observations varies by country, we use weighted regressions so as to give  
each country the same weight in the final sample. Unobserved heteroskedasticity is treated 
using robust standard errors. We test for the endogeneity of NT and T using the Durbin – Wu 
– Hausman test and find that the null hypothesis of no endogeneity is rejected for tracking 
years T (p-value of the test: 0.000) but not for the years NT in a comprehensive school (p-
value: 0.482). These results confirm our maintained hypothesis that NT can be treated as 
exogenous. 
Our key results are presented in Table 3. The table is organized in four columns. The 
first two columns are reserved to the more parsimonious specification, and the latter two 
columns to the specification with country by age dummies. Moreover, we present OLS 
estimates in the odd columns and IV estimates in the even columns. For simplicity, we only 
report the coefficients associated to the education variables. The estimates of the other 
coefficients are available from the authors upon request. We notice that the Bound F test of 
excluded instruments cannot reject the null hypothesis (joint significance), which signals that 
the selected instruments are not weak. Moreover, the Hansen J test for the validity of 
instruments always rejects the null of  misspecification. Our OLS estimates (columns (1) and 
(3)) show that the years spent in a comprehensive school pay off in terms of standardized test   11
scores about as much as the years spent in a tracked school, which suggests that allocation to 
tracking does not raise school performance as measured by our selected indicator.  
On the other hand, our IV estimates (columns (2) and (4)) tell a different story: we 
find that one additional year of tracking raises the attained score by 4.5 to 4.6 percent, 
compared to the 1.1 to 1.2 percent induced by an additional year in a comprehensive school, 
depending on the specification. Furthermore, the difference in returns is statistically 
significant. These estimates suggest that spending one additional year in a tracked school 
rather than in a comprehensive school raises performance by 3.3 to 3.4 percent.  
The finding that IV estimates of the returns to tracking are higher than OLS estimates 
can be due to a variety of reasons, including the fact that constrained individuals who are 
forced to drop out have higher returns to schooling than the average individual. Under the 
maintained assumption that differences in school outcomes are positively correlated to 
differences in productivity, and that the cost of tracking and non tracking systems are not 
substantially different, our findings point out that additional tracking in secondary school 
contributes to higher productivity and efficiency
10.  
For the sake of illustration, suppose that our results are general enough to be applied to 
the relevant population, and that we can compare two individuals with the same observable 
characteristics but different type of schooling: the first student has 10 years of comprehensive 
schooling and 2 years of tracking, and the latter student has 4 years of comprehensive 
education and 8 years of tracking. Then our estimates predict that the performance of the 
latter student in standardized test scores is about 20 higher (6 x 0.033) than the performance 
of the former. This is a significant effect, equivalent to about 1 standard deviation of the log 
test score.  
How general are our results? As discussed by Angrist, 2003, IV estimates capture a 
local average treatment effect (LATE), that is, the effect of the instruments on the sub-
population of compliers, who have changed their behaviour as a result of the treatment. LATE 
estimates have two important features: a) they can differ substantially from the average effect 
of additional tracking on a randomly selected individual (ATE), especially when the fraction 
of the population affected is small. In our sample, the percentage of dropouts because of 
credit constraints, illness and family reasons is 9.83 percent; b) they are instrument dependent. 
Therefore, our answer to the question on the generality of our results has to be negative. Even 
                                                 
10 The fact that our IV estimates of the contribution of tracking to performance are significantly higher than the 
OLS estimates is in line with the returns to education literature, which typically finds that estimated returns 
based on IV are much larger than OLS estimates.  
   12
so, we do believe that our results cast some doubt on the view that de-tracking secondary 






The question addressed in this paper is whether tracking length in secondary schools 
affects school performance, as measured by standardized test scores. We have used the 
international data from the International Adult Literacy Survey to estimate the relationship 
between tracking length and the performance in standardized cognitive test scores of young 
adults, aged between 16 and the mid - twenties. Our IV estimates suggest that the contribution 
of tracking to performance is positive and statistically significant: conditional on total years of 
schooling, one additional year spent in a track raises average performance by 3.3 to 3.4 
percentage points, depending on the estimates. While we do not claim that these findings are 
general, they suggest that views that de-tracking secondary schools generate equity gains with 
no efficiency losses may be too optimistic.   
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Table 1. School Design in a sample of OECD Countries. 
  Age when 
compulsory 
education ends 





Age when primary 
education starts 
Switzerland  15 15 20  7 
Germany 18 10 19  6 
Usa  17 16 18  6 
Ireland  16 15 18  6 
Poland  15 15 19  7 
Sweden  16 16 20  7 
New  Zealand  16 16 18  6 
UK  16 16 18  5 
Belgium  18 12 19  6 
Italy  14 14 19  6 
Norway  16 16 19  6 
Slovenia  15 15 18  6 
Denmark 16 16 20  7 
Finland  16 16 19  7 
Hungary   16 10 20  6 
Chile  14 14 18  6 
      
Source: see text.   14
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of the key variables 
 Sample  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Average test score  267.59  53.03 
Log average test score  5.563  0.232 
Gender 0.487   
Age 20.589  3.493 
Foreign born  0.042   
Single 0.676   
Lives in urban area  0.608   
Years of education  10.702  1.735 
Years in comprehensive school  8.128  1.944 
Year in tracking   2.536  2.259 
Dummy: dropped out because of: financial reasons  0.048   
Dummy: dropped out because of: family reasons  0.041   
Dummy: dropped out because of: illness or no school 
available 
0.009  
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Table 3. Effects of tracking length of test performance. Dependent variable: log average test 
score in prose, documentation and quantitative knowledge. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
















        








        
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Country by Age Dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes 
        
Family Background Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Health Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls for Self-Assessed Literacy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls for Cultural and Social Activities  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls for Labour Market Status  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls for Motivation and Attitude 
toward School 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
        
R Squared  .492  .480  .494  .483 
Number of observations  7221  7221  7221  7221 








       
Note: robust standard errors within parentheses. Each regression includes a constant, dummies for gender, urban residence 
and marital status. Columns (1) and (3) include also individual age and its square. 
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